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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to determine what actions can be taken by American 
military forces to set conditions for conducting effective Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO) campaigns in counterinsurgency (COIN) conflicts. To 
find these actions, hypotheses built upon tenets found in American military 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) doctrine were compared to empirical 
observations of PSYOP conducted in three COIN case studies from the 1950s and 
1960s. Because COIN literature is ripe with assertions, such as Dr. Kalev I. 
Sepp's, that "effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns" 
are inherent in successful COIN operations, it is ironic that few works discuss 
specific recommendations regarding the design and conduct of such campaigns. 
This study begins filling this literature gap by showing that MISO relationship to 
other operations holds greater significance in effective MISO campaign design 
than internal details such as the level of centralization. This finding supports 
contemporary calls for a more unified group of inform and influence practitioners 
within the United States military, as well as calls for the United States 
government to draft a National Information Strategy to better leverage this 
important element of national power. 
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During the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 
1975, many military resources were expended in the counterinsurgency (COIN) 
fight against the Viet Cong. One American resource in particular used in Vietnam 
has begun to receive renewed attention: Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 
which have recently been renamed Military Information Support Operations 
(MISO).1 While most literature about American PSYOP in Vietnam seems to find 
more faults than strengths regarding its implementation, few authors have 
examined United States PSYOP efforts in a rigorous manner from which lessons 
could be derived for use in modern MISO.2 While Dr. John A. Nagl has compared 
American COIN efforts in Vietnam to British COIN efforts in Malaya in his book 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, even this work only devotes three pages to 
PSYOP in Malaya and fails to discuss United States PSYOP activities in Vietnam. 
In order to help correct this omission, this thesis examines under what conditions 
PSYOP successfully assisted military forces in major American and British COIN 
conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s.3 As a result, this thesis not only adds to the 
study of MISO, but also fills the void in literature about conditions under which 
MISO can successfully contribute to COIN conflicts.   
                                            
1 As of June 23, 2010, the term Psychological Operations (PSYOP) was officially replaced in 
United States military usage with the term Military Information Support Operations (MISO). This 
change was initiated with a memorandum from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School's Commander Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, citing the need for greater recognition, 
understanding, and appreciation of military "inform and influence" activities.  
2 The only comprehensive study of MISO in the Vietnam War that thoroughly examined 
operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels known to this author is Dr. Robert W. 
Chandler, War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1981).  
3 Even though the United Kingdom's armed forces use the abbreviation PSYOPS to refer to 
Psychological Operations, the American abbreviation PSYOP will be used throughout this thesis 
for clarity. 
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A.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
What actions can be taken by Western military forces to set conditions for 
successful MISO campaigns in COIN conflicts? The importance of this question is 
two-fold. First, compared to the voluminous number of works discussing how 
Western military forces like those of the United States and United Kingdom can 
leverage maneuver or fires to their advantage on the battlefield, very few works 
have been written about how these forces can leverage psychological or 
informational actions to gain battlefield advantages. Out of the few works that do 
examine PSYOP in depth like Ron D. McLaurin's Military Propaganda or Colonel 
Frank L. Goldstein's Psychological Operations, the only work that is wholly 
dedicated to the conduct of PSYOP during a COIN conflict is War of Ideas: The 
U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. 
Chandler.4 Unfortunately, most other exceptional works that are devoted to 
PSYOP in COIN conflicts like Dr. Robert J. Kodosky's Psychological Operations 
American Style or Caroline Page's The Limits of Persuasion are focused on 
campaign failures, which are mostly at the strategic level and do not include 
prescriptions for remedying these failures in future conflicts.5 As a result, this 
thesis begins to fill a significant gap in the literature on MISO in COIN conflicts.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to determine what actions can be taken by 
Western military forces (particularly British or American) to set conditions for 
effective MISO campaigns in COIN conflicts. These actions will be determined by 
comparing hypotheses to empirical observations of PSYOP conducted in three 
                                            
4 R. D. McLaurin, Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations (New York, 
N.Y: Praeger, 1982); Frank L. Goldstein, Benjamin F. Findley and Air University, Psychological 
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA316643. Fort Belvoir 
Defense Technical Information Center, 1996); Chandler, War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda 
Campaign in Vietnam. 
5 Robert J. Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States 
Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007); Caroline Page, 
U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: The Limits of Persuasion (New 
York: Leicester University Press, 1996). 
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case studies of COIN conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s. Because COIN literature 
is ripe with assertions such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp's that "effective, pervasive 
psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns" are inherent in successful COIN 
operations, this research has the potential to benefit current United States and 
United Kingdom military operations in Afghanistan.6 Additionally, this research 
can also provide planners with greater insight on how to best support future 
American COIN activities with MISO. 
C.  CASE STUDY SELECTION 
Since World War II, the United States and United Kingdom have taken 
part in 21 COIN conflicts as either one of the main combatants or indirectly 
supporting one of the main combatants. Out of all 21 conflicts, American or 
British involvement in over half of these COIN conflicts began during the 1950s or 
1960s.7 Thus, the frequency in which American and British forces conducted 
COIN operations during this period make it optimum for studying how forces set 
conditions for PSYOP.   
While the period of these case studies was selected because of the 
frequency American and British forces conducted COIN operations, the reason for 
examining the United Kingdom's COIN conflicts, in addition to those of the United 
States, is threefold. First, both the American and British military forces involved 
were very similar culturally and technologically. Second, both the United States 
and United Kingdom had closely linked military policy because of their common 
bonds through the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other 
similar political agreements. The third and final significant similarity between 
                                            
6 Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (May-June, 2005), 8–
12,  10. 
7 See Appendix A "Post-World War II Insurgencies" taken from Frank H. Zimmerman, "Why 
Insurgents Fail: Examining Post-World War II Failed Insurgencies Utilizing the Prerequisites of 
Successful Insurgencies as a Framework" (Master of Science in Information Operations, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007). Lieutenant Colonel Zimmerman compiled this comprehensive list of 
post-World War II insurgencies primarily from the following references: Anthony James Joes, 
Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996) and Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, 8–12.   
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American and British military forces was their close cooperation with each other 
to include providing advisors during combat operations in the Vietnam War.8 
In order to limit the COIN case studies examined in this thesis to those 
most comparable to the current conflict in Afghanistan, only COIN conflicts 
meeting two criteria are considered in this paper. First, a COIN conflict must 
involve the simultaneous deployment of at least a division or its equivalent of 
United States or United Kingdom troops (roughly 10,000 personnel or more). 
Second, each COIN conflict must have taken place in a country other than 
America or Britain, not domestically such as the insurgency in Northern Ireland. 
After these two filters were applied to the comprehensive list of post-World War II 
insurgencies found in Appendix A, the following COIN conflicts were selected to 
provide case studies for this thesis: the British Malayan Emergency, the 
American Vietnam War, and the British Kenyan Emergency (see Table 1: COIN 
Conflict Selection Criteria).  
 
                                            
8 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005),  130–131. 
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Table 1.   COIN Conflict Selection Criteria 
D.  HYPOTHESES 
To build hypotheses for testing within this paper's three case studies, a 
combination of American military doctrine sources were used to compile a list of 
variables that are both fairly unique to PSYOP and doctrinally considered 
"important" or "essential" for the conduct of successful PSYOP. Although many of 
the sources used contained material that over-lapped to a moderate level, the 
clearest references to the variables selected listed by source is found in Table 2: 




Table 2.   Variables Impacting PSYOP Campaign Effectiveness by Source. 
These five variables combed out of doctrinal sources that are essential to 
effective PSYOP were expanded into six variables in order to better gauge how 
nested PSYOP were with other operations by examining them at both the strategic 
and tactical levels. Now totaling six variables, the refined list used in this study is 
as follows: cultural knowledge, responsiveness to target audience feedback, 
centralization of operational control, use of multiple media forms, level of 
consideration given to psychological factors in the strategy pursued, and level of 
support for other tactical operations. Although these six variables can be grouped 
in many ways, certain pairings make natural combinations since some variables 
either must go together or are typically found together. For example, in order to 
increase the types of media used in PSYOP, an operation will need to be 
conducted at a higher (and thus more centralized) level of military command to 
provide fuller access to multiple forms of media. Also, if PSYOP are decentralized 
in an effort to maximize responsiveness, then units executing these operations 
must have a flexible framework on which to plan their actions. Such a framework 
would undoubtedly be based on their mission, but would have to include at least 
some cultural knowledge about target audiences in order to succeed. As a result, 
the following three hypotheses will be used to evaluate the conditions under 
which PSYOP were conducted in the three case studies:  
1. If PSYOP leverage cultural knowledge and respond quickly to target 
audience feedback, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase. 
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2. If PSYOP are more centrally controlled and use more forms of 
media, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase. 
3. If PSYOP are conducted in support of a strategy that leverages a 
conflict's psychological aspects, then PSYOP effectiveness will 
increase. 
 To further illustrate each variable's fit with the other variables used in each 
hypothesis, Table 3: Hypotheses Characterizations shows how the six variables 
are grouped into hypotheses and the over-all nature of each hypothesis.  
 
Table 3.   Hypothesis Characterizations 
The variables examined in Hypothesis 3 characterize a PSYOP campaign that is 
well nested with other operations at all levels within a conflict. The variables 
examined in Hypothesis 2 characterize a centralized PSYOP campaign where 
planning and execution predominantly occur at the operational or strategic level 
while the variables examined in Hypothesis 1 characterize a decentralized PSYOP 
campaign where planning and execution predominantly occur at the tactical level.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, historical case studies of American and British COIN 
operations conducted in the 1950s and 1960s will be used to derive empirical 
observations about the conditions under which PSYOP are conducted in COIN 
conflicts. These empirical observations will be compared to three distinct 
hypotheses using the methods of congruence and process tracing to test each 
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hypothesis' application in three case studies. The congruence method is well 
suited to hypothesis testing using a limited number of cases because, as Drs. 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett explain, it "... begins with a theory and 
then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular 
case."9 To further test whether any relationships between hypotheses and the 
dependent variable of effective PSYOP identified with the congruence method are 
actually causal or merely spurious, the process tracing method will be used to 
refine the research results.10 The process tracing method is well suited for this 
role since the hypotheses examined rely on observing two independent variables 
that, despite their independent effects on the dependent variable, hold the 
possibility of producing other interaction effects that could prove relevant to this 
research.11      
Hypothesis #1: If PSYOP leverage cultural knowledge and respond 
quickly to target audience feedback, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase. 
In order for a case study to prove this first hypothesis correct, the ability of 
British or American forces to plan effective PSYOP using cultural knowledge and 
modify these plans rapidly based on target audience feedback must be evident. 
Both these indicators and their importance are outlined in current American 
military doctrinal publications that include FM 3-13 Information Operations and 
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency.12 Although other factors such as resource allocation 
are important to PSYOP planning and execution, they are inherently important to 
any military undertaking and not unique to PSYOP.  
                                            
9 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005),  181. 
10 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development,  182. 
11 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 206. 
12 United States Army, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures: FM 3-13 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003); United 
States Army, Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 2006). 
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Hypothesis #2: If PSYOP are more centrally controlled and use more 
forms of media, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase.  
In order for a case study to prove this hypothesis correct, the PSYOP 
conducted by British or American forces must have been controlled in a 
centralized manner and incorporated multiple forms of media. The importance of 
these conditions for conducting effective PSYOP is further demonstrated by their 
inclusion in modern American doctrinal publications such as JP 3-13.2 
Psychological Operations and FM 3-13 Information Operations.13 Historical 
literature on PSYOP is scarce, so often times it is necessary to gauge the level of 
centralization in a PSYOP based on how scarce the media it employed was in a 
particular theatre of operations.  
Hypothesis #3: If PSYOP are conducted in support of a strategy that 
leverages a conflict's psychological aspects, then PSYOP effectiveness will 
increase.  
In order for a case study to prove this hypothesis correct, United States or 
United Kingdom forces (both civil and military) engaged in a COIN conflict must 
have employed a strategy that was formed with an appreciation for the 
psychological impacts of planned actions and how these impacts could be used 
to further American or British objectives in the conflict. If PSYOP are conducted in 
a COIN conflict with just such a strategy, this hypothesis predicts these PSYOP will 
prove more effective than similar operations conducted in support of a strategy 
lacking appreciation of the conflict's psychological nature. Thus, the question this 
hypothesis asks of each case study is whether the strategy in each conflict 
entailed "war waged psychologically" or just conflict with psychological warfare in 
the form of PSYOP added as an adjunct to military operations. Several authors 
including Drs. Kodosky and Page have credited the lack of PSYOP coordination 
with government policy as being detrimental to United States military operations 
                                            
13 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Psychological Operations: JP 3-13.2 (Washington, 
D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010); United States Army, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures: FM 3-13. 
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during the Vietnam War, which could be indicative of a COIN conflict in which 
war was not waged psychologically at the strategic level.14 The conclusions 
about why American strategists did not show an appreciation of the Vietnam 
War's psychological aspects vary between these authors, but both authors 
clearly agree that war's over-all strategy and operational / tactical level PSYOP 
were not well synchronized, which resulted in devastating effects on American 
military efforts.  
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The way people communicate with each other, particularly when the 
communication's goal is to influence another person, has been studied at varying 
levels by numerous investigators over the decades. While many civilian 
applications like marketing and mass media have benefited from this research, 
literature drawing upon communication theory that specifically addresses military 
applications has been neither common nor plentiful. While publications such as 
Colonel Goldstein's Psychological Operations and Dr. Hy S. Rothstein's "Strategy 
and Psychological Operations" have helped to fill this void by directly addressing 
PSYOP in various conflicts, very few books have holistically examined PSYOP 
within a specific conflict in a manner that can readily inform modern military 
influence practitioners about the necessary conditions for conducting effective 
MISO.15 While it is highly unlikely that MISO will single-handedly win a conflict, 
nonetheless its practice can make significant contributions to victory, especially 
in COIN warfare.16 Because of the limited body of literature focusing on military 
PSYOP, government service manuals such as the Army's Field Manuals 3-05.301 
                                            
14 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style; Page, U.S. Official Propaganda 
during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973. 
15 Goldstein, Findley and Air University, Psychological Operations; Hy S. Rothstein, "Strategy 
and Psychological Operations," in Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and 
Practice (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
16 United States Army, Psychological Operations: FM 3-05.30. Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005, 
https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_05x30.pdf (accessed May 
2010),  1–1. 
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and 3-05.302 Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures or 
Joint Publication 3-13.2 Psychological Operations are used throughout this thesis 
to not only standardize the terminology used to describe the conduct of PSYOP, 
but more importantly to provide many of the theoretical underpinnings for the 
hypotheses being tested.17 
While several studies have compared American COIN tactics in Vietnam to 
British COIN tactics in the Malayan Emergency, such as Dr. John Nagl's book 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and Sam Sarkesian's Unconventional Conflicts 
in a New Security Era, these works do not spend much time examining PSYOP 
activities let alone comparing PSYOP in these conflicts to other relevant COIN 
conflicts.18 Fortunately, this trend has recently begun to change regarding 
American involvement in the Vietnam War with the publication of Dr. Robert 
Kodosky's Psychological Operations American Style and Dr. Caroline Page's The 
Limits of Persuasion.19 While both of these works cite a lack of cultural 
understanding and poor coordination between PSYOP and the conflict's over-all 
strategy, neither produce insights regarding how to correct these problems and, 
once corrected, if this will produce effective PSYOP campaigns. 
Although many books discuss the United Kingdom's Kenyan Emergency, 
most of these books such as Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham's The Myth of 
"Mau Mau" focus on African nationalism, human rights, or Kikuyu tribal 
motivations in becoming Mau Mau more than the conflict's military operations.20 
Other books like Wunyabari O. Maloba's Mau Mau and Kenya and Anthony 
                                            
17 United States Army, Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures: FM 3-05.301 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007); 
United States Army, Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: FM 
3-05.302 w/ Change 1 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009); United 
States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Psychological Operations: JP 3-13.2. 
18 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a 
New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
19 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style; Page, U.S. Official Propaganda 
during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973. 
20 Carl Gustav Rosberg and John Cato Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau"; Nationalism in 
Kenya (Stanford: Calif., Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace by 
Praeger, New York, 1966). 
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Clayton's Counter-Insurgency in Kenya detail British military operations whose 
success hinged upon PSYOP. These PSYOP were characterized by counter-
oathing rituals used separate individuals from the insurgency and create pseudo-
gangs composed of these former insurgents who collected intelligence and 
fought against their former comrades.21 Despite the credit given to British PSYOP 
for ending the Mau Mau insurgency, very few publications take an in-depth look 
at this successful PSYOP campaign and even fewer provide modern implications 
for the PSYOP lessons learned from this conflict. 
G. CHAPTER REVIEW 
With the theoretical construction of this thesis established in the first 
chapter, succeeding chapters will critically test this study's three hypotheses 
through examining their ability to explain the conditions under which PSYOP were 
conducted in three case studies (Malaya, Vietnam, and Kenya). Each of the 
following chapters will provide an overview of either the United States or United 
Kingdom's military involvement in a single case study, the PSYOP these forces 
conducted, and finish by evaluating which hypothesis or hypotheses best 
explained the conflict in question's results. Following the three case study 
oriented chapters, Chapter V consolidates this thesis' conclusions and identifies 
observed trends. Finally, Chapter VI presents recommendations based on the 
conclusions in Chapter V for MISO in Afghanistan, possible MISO doctrinal or 
policy changes, and future research on this topic. In this thesis' appendices, 
Appendix A provides a comprehensive list of post-World War II insurgencies 
United States or United Kingdom military forces took part in, Appendix B provides 
selected maps tied to the case studies discussed, and Appendix C illustrates 
samples of printed PSYOP products from each case study.  
                                            
21 Wunyabari O. Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Anthony Clayton, Counter-Insurgency in Kenya: A 
Study of Military Operations Against Mau Mau (Nairobi: Transafrica Publishers, 1976). 
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II. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960) 
The shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and 
the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us 
[the British Colonial Administration]. 
- Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer, 195222 
A. AN OVER-VIEW OF THE EMERGENCY 
Located in the South China Sea below Thailand and above Sumatra, the 
modern state of Malaysia was a colonial possession of the United Kingdom 
known as Malaya from 1824 with the Dutch-Anglo Treaty of that year until August 
1957 when it was granted full independence.23 Covered by densely forested hills 
and mountains, Malaysia is as large as the states of Texas and Louisiana 
combined with its roughly 320,000 square kilometers of land.24 During World War 
II, the British sponsored Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) fought 
the occupying Imperial Japanese Army as a guerrilla force until the war's end.25 
Following World War II, the MPAJA fused with the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP) to form the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in order to help speed 
the promised British withdrawal from Malaya and ensure a communist  
                                            
22 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-
1960 (Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 259. This quote by the British 
High Commissioner and Director of Operations Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer came nine 
months into his service in this position which gave him complete executive authority over "all 
services, civil and military." Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare,  139–140. 
23 Bryan J. Hunt, "Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960," Air Power 
Review 11, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 6-18, 14; Wikipedia, "Malaysia," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia (accessed September 2010). 
24 Wikipedia, Malaysia; Wikipedia, "Listing of U.S. States and Territories by Area," Wikimedia 
Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_area 
(accessed September 2010). 
25 Sir Robert Thompson, War in Peace: Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945 
(New York: Harmony Books, 1982), 82. 
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government took power afterwards.26 Despite its racially inclusive title, the MRLA 
was ethnically over 90 percent Chinese while only 38 percent of Malaya's 
population was of Chinese descent in 1945.27 
Beginning in response to the murders of three European planters in 1948 
by MRLA elements, the British-led Malayan colonial government declared a state 
of emergency that lasted until 1960.28 Although martial law was not declared 
during this period that would come to be called the Malayan Emergency, United 
Kingdom military forces played a vital role in COIN operations against the MRLA in 
support of the colonial government.29 Guerrilla activities conducted by the MRLA 
included occasional ambushes and assassinations coupled with an active 
propaganda campaign stressing the illegitimacy of British administration in 
Malaya.30 In spite of killing a combined total of over 1,800 military and police 
members and over 2,400 civilians during the 12-year emergency, the MRLA’s 
greatest accomplishment was the accidental assassination of Malayan High 
Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney in October of 1951.31  
In response to these tactics, United Kingdom civil and military forces 
worked through the Malayan government to segregate ethnically Chinese 
residents in "New Villages" under government control. Population relocation into 
these villages, combined with food-control measures, worked to deny the MRLA 
resources needed to continue their struggle. Although conventional military 
tactics like ambushes and sweeps generally proved fruitless against MRLA 
elements, indigenous Malayan forces under British leadership were able to apply 
                                            
26 A. F. Derry, Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension (Latimer, United 
Kingdom: Psychological Operations Section, Joint Warfare Wing, National Defence College, 
1982), Chapter 1, 2. 
27 Thompson, War in Peace, 82; Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, 12. 
28 Hunt, Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960, 6–18, 7. 
29 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 1, 3. 
30 Thompson, War in Peace, 82-83; Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 
1948-1960 (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975), 107–108. 
31 Hunt, Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960, 6–18, 10–11. 
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these tactics with some success late in the emergency.32 Tying all of these 
operational measures together and maximizing their effectiveness, though, were 
the United Kingdom's PSYOP conducted during the emergency. In fact, seven 
years into the emergency in 1955 when leaflet drops were at their peak, 
"psychological warfare operations were achieving greater successes than direct 
military operations."33  
After the progress made by British High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer 
in the 1950s, such as granting ethnic Indians and Chinese Malayans full 
citizenship, increasing women's role in public life, bringing electricity to remote 
villages, and other projects like building schools and hospitals; in 1955 Templer's 
successor Sir Donald MacGillivray held elections and, in 1957, Malaya became a 
fully independent state.34 The 1955 elections resulted in an overwhelming victory 
for the anti-communist Alliance Party. This undercut whatever remaining 
legitimacy the MRLA maintained with Malayan citizens and caused the MCP to 
begin planning demobilization of the MRLA in an effort to become a legitimate 
political party. After being hunted down deep into the jungle and continually 
denied resources by British population and food control measures, by July 1960, 
the MRLA was totally defeated and the 12 year long Malayan Emergency 
declared over.35   
B.  BRITISH PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
Originally a responsibility of the Malayan Department of Public Relations, 
responsibility for producing "psychological warfare" materials to use against MRLA 
insurgents and "propaganda" to raise public morale shifted to the Emergency 
Information Service staff organized by the Director of Operations for the Malayan 
                                            
32 Thompson, War in Peace, 86–89. 
33 Hunt, Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960, 6–18, 11. 
34 Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," 8-12, 9; Thompson, War in Peace, 83. 
35 Thompson, War in Peace, 83. 
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Government, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, in 1950.36 Headed by the 
former Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation Hugh Carleton 
Greene, the Emergency Information Service staff at the national or federal level 
never numbered more than 30 personnel of which 80 percent were Chinese, 10 
percent ethnic Malayas, 5 percent Indian (Tamil), and 5 percent European.37 
Below the federal level, staffs at the state / settlement and district levels were 
ideally composed of one Emergency Information Officer and at least one full-time 
Chinese assistant. Because of a shortage of qualified personnel, state / 
settlement level Chinese Affairs Officers often had to split their time between 
fulfilling their normally assigned duties and acting in lieu of a Chinese assistant 
for the Emergency Information Officer.38  
Although the majority of PSYOP were coordinated and executed below the 
federal level, the federal Emergency Information Service staff was still able to 
provide substantial support and guidance to make lower level staff's outputs 
more effective, which made it "a model organization of its kind."39 A good 
example of how the federal level Emergency Information Service staff aided 
subordinate staff elements can be seen in the efforts put forth by two of its 
Chinese members. Exceptionally gifted at producing products tailored to local 
audiences, these two Chinese staff members stood out for their leadership 
abilities and unique contributions to British PSYOP efforts during the Malayan 
Emergency.  
The first of these two outstanding Emergency Information Service staff 
members was Too Chee Chew commonly known by the nickname C. C. Too 
                                            
36 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960, 416. 
37 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960, 416; Derry, Emergency in 
Malaya, Chapter 3, 1. 
38 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, A-1 to A-2. 
39 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 4, 1.  
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given him by two American Office of Strategic Services officers in 1945.40 Son of 
a Chinese millionaire and a one-time journalist, C. C. Too was not only able to 
understand the mentality and motivation of MRLA leaders, but often knew these 
figures personally.41 Too's detailed cultural and social knowledge of the Malayan 
Chinese population, combined with his empathy for the "misguided" members of 
the MRLA, allowed him to improve the quality of PSYOP products like newspapers 
and leaflets while also influencing PSYOP policy. Working in conjunction with the 
MRLA defector Lam Swee, Too personally oversaw the publication of the New 
Path News, as well as other publications supporting British COIN efforts.42 Also, 
Too's personal policy of "no hate" towards MRLA members meshed well with the 
government's official policy of offering amnesty and other rewards to insurgents 
who surrendered and began new lives away from the MCP.43 As a result, Too "... 
became something of a legend in Malaya" who went on to receive the British 
Member of the Most Distinguished Order of the British Empire and Malaysian 
Knight Commander of the Order of the Crown for his work in Psychological 
Warfare (PSYWAR) both during and after the emergency.44 
The second exceptional member of the Emergency Information Service 
staff was the aforementioned defector Lam Swee. Before defecting, Lam Swee 
was the Party Political Commissar of the MRLA 4th Regiment.45 In addition to 
                                            
40 Herbert A. Friedman, "Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960," 
Psywar.org, http://www.psywar.org/malaya.php (accessed September 2010). Apparently the two 
American Office of Strategic Services officers in question had trouble remembering Too Chee 
Chew's full name. 
41 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 3, 1; Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, 
The Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960 (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972), 115; Derry, 
Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 3, 1. 
42 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, 180. 
43 Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, 117–119. Emergency Information Service Director 
Hugh Carelton Greene is officially credited with recommending what C. C. Too called his "no 
hate" policy in 1950 when he argued the governments current "stringing them up, no matter what" 
policy gave insurgents no choice but to continue fighting. After Greene threatened to resign if his 
recommendation was not accepted, the Malayan government's policy changed so that rewards of 
various sorts could be offered to surrendering MRLA members (Derry, Emergency in Malaya, 
Chapter 1, 3).  
44 Friedman, Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960. 
45 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 3, 1. 
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helping publish a variety of literature as a member of the Emergency Information 
Service staff, Swee's booklet My Accusation about his personal experiences in 
the MRLA was an extremely effective product that presented very credible stories 
about communist abuses and fabrications.46 Also, from 1951 on Swee proved to 
be very influential as a travelling lecturer explaining the errors and futility of 
supporting the MRLA to audiences in villages throughout Malaya.47  
Despite being at the top of Malaya's PSYWAR organizational hierarchy, the 
federal Emergency Information Office's skilled staff was able to support a variety 
of tactical and strategic PSYOP in a rapid, effective manner with a variety of 
media. Even though some forms of media proved more effective with civilian 
target audiences while others were more influential with insurgents, the federal 
Emergency Information Service staff was able to conduct messaging using radio, 
films, ground and airborne loudspeakers, face-to-face engagements and public 
speeches by Surrendered Enemy Personnel, and printed products like leaflets 
featuring graphics produced through cartooning, illustrating, or photography.48 
Based on the writings of retired Royal Air Force intelligence officer Wing 
Commander A. F. Derry, the following list of media used by the Emergency 
Information Service in Malaya is ranked in descending order based on its 
effectiveness at influencing MRLA members and lists the period in which each 
form of media was used during the Malayan Emergency. 
 
1. Leaflets       1948–1960 
2. Personal appearance of ranking Surrendered                               
Enemy Personnel     1951–1953 
3. Government films     1952–1954 
4. Airborne loudspeakers     1953–1954 
5. Playlets acted out by Surrendered Enemy                               
Personnel       1951–1954 
                                            
46 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 310–311. 
47 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 3, 1–2. 
48 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 4, 1. 
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6. Vernacular press publications    1948–1960 
7. Ground-mounted loudspeakers    1950–195249 
Requests for customized loudspeaker broadcasts were often translated into 
Chinese, Malay, Tamil, or another language and ready for broadcast within 24 
hours. If requests were received by the Emergency Information Service's Voice 
Aircraft Committee before 1000 hours, broadcasts could be available for 
subordinate staffs on the same day they were requested.50 Customized leaflets 
took only three to five days to produce and disseminate for state or district 
Emergency Information Officers, as well as other entities like tactical military or 
police units. During leaflet drops, the federal Emergency Information Service staff 
was able to have customized leaflets dropped over large areas or in bundles of 
5,000 over areas as small as 1,000 meters square. This allowed British forces to 
effectively tailor their PSYOP product dissemination to strategically cover large 
areas or tactically cover villages, farming plots, and other areas suspected to 
contain MRLA members.51 As PSYOP efforts drew more MRLA members to 
become Surrendered Enemy Personnel and intelligence on the MRLA increased 
in quantity and quality, broadcasts and printed products were even able to 
effectively target individual insurgent leaders, which proved "most unnerving" to 
them and helped increase the number of MRLA members becoming Surrendered 
Enemy Personnel.52     
                                            
49 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 4, 2. 
50 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 6, 2–3. 
51 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 6, 1; A. F. Derry, "Psychological Warfare in Malaya," 
(circa 1955), 2. 
52 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 423–424. Short implicitly 
attributes the increase of MRLA becoming Surrendered Enemy Personnel in 1953 to just such 
individualized PSYOP products. In 1953, 372 MRLA members became Surrendered Enemy 
Personnel while in previous years the numbers were 257 in 1952, 201 in 1951, 147 in 1950, and 
251 in 1949.  
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C. BRITISH PSYOP EFFORTS 
From the Malayan Emergency's beginning in 1948, MCP and MRLA 
activities were marked by an ever increasing use of propaganda to win over the 
population's support.53 Through focusing on perceived burdens placed upon the 
Malayan people by the British administered government like high taxes and no 
freedom of assembly, the MRLA actively spread propaganda verbally and in 
booklet form to increase their credibility vis-a-vis the government with the 
Malayan population.54 While British leaders incrementally made political reforms 
that undercut many of the MRLA propaganda themes, the United Kingdom's 
approach to PSYOP throughout the emergency was best summarized by the 
Malayan Civil Servant Sir Robert Thompson when he stated:  
The main basis of a successful psychological warfare campaign will 
depend on a clear and precise government surrender policy 
towards the insurgents. Such a policy has three main aims: (1) to 
encourage insurgent surrenders; (2) to sow dissension between 
insurgent rank-and-file and their leaders; and (3) to create an image 
of government both to the insurgents and to the population which is 
both firm and efficient but at the same time just and generous.55 
These aims were carried out through PSYOP product dissemination 
focused on small areas in tactical support of police or military units and 
strategically with product dissemination over wide areas aimed at both 
insurgent and civilian audiences.56 While in 1951 these efforts' biggest 
contribution was a five-fold increase in actionable intelligence provided to 
British forces, by 1955 over 70 percent of all Surrendered Enemy 
Personnel used safe conduct passes disseminated chiefly as leaflets 
when surrendering.57 Even aerial loudspeaker operations made a 
significant contribution with 91 percent of all Surrendered Enemy 
                                            
53 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 65. 
54 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960, 107–108. 
55 Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, 118–119. 
56 Derry, Psychological Warfare in Malaya, 3–4. 
57 Hunt, Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya, 6–18, 14. 
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Personnel who heard such broadcasts before surrendering considering 
them to be highly influential in 1956 alone.58 While ultimately a 
combination of political actions, resource control measures, and combined 
military and police operations physically destroyed the MRLA ability to 
operate, these measures would not have proven as effective without the 
intelligence and credibility British PSYOP increasingly provided the Malayan 
government more of throughout the emergency.59 
D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Out of the three hypotheses presented in this thesis, the United Kingdom's 
PSYOP during the Malayan Emergency followed the conditions-setting pattern 
described by the second and third hypotheses more closely than the one put 
forth in the first hypothesis. In Table 4: Malayan Emergency Hypothesis Testing 
Matrix, the relative levels of each variable found in the Malayan Emergency case 
study are shown along with how these levels match this study's three 
hypotheses. In fact, this case study matched both the second and third 
hypotheses' predictions to a high degree.   
 
                                            
58 Hunt, Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya, 6–18, 14. 




Table 4.   Malayan Emergency Hypothesis Testing Matrix 
In the second hypothesis, if PSYOP were more centrally controlled and used more 
forms of media, then their effectiveness would increase. Throughout the Malayan 
Emergency, the federal level Emergency Information Service staff held defacto 
authority over almost all PSYOP products and messaging because only they 
produced printed products and voice broadcasts.60 Thus, with face-to-face 
engagements and speeches made by Surrendered Enemy Personnel being the 
only possible exception, no product was produced for state or district Emergency 
Information Officers without the federal Emergency Information Service staff's 
approval. The forms of media used by the federal Emergency Information 
Service included radio broadcasts, film presentations, ground and airborne 
loudspeaker broadcasts, face-to-face engagements and public speeches by 
Surrendered Enemy Personnel, and printed products like leaflets and booklets. 
While all of these media were used to support lower level state and district 
Emergency Information Officers, authority for their use was held at the federal 
level throughout the emergency.  
                                            
60 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, A-6 and A-14. 
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 In the third hypothesis, if PSYOP were conducted in support of a strategy 
that leveraged a conflict's psychological aspects, then PSYOP effectiveness would 
increase. Whether examining the plan adopted by Direct of Operations Sir Harold 
Briggs in 1950 or the continued efforts of the British High Commissioners 
following him, such as Sir Gerald Templer, it is clear that as the Malayan 
Emergency progressed the United Kingdom's forces paid close attention to the 
Malayan population's needs and met these needs in ways that provided them a 
psychological advantage over the MRLA. This psychological advantage was really 
a credibility advantage that British forces fostered and increased in their favor. As 
the Briggs Plan of 1950 so succinctly described this process, United Kingdom 
civil and military forces would increase their credibility by providing the Malayan 
people security and access to information about the MRLA:  
(a) by demonstrating Britain's firm intention to fulfill her obligations 
in defence of Malaya against both external attack and internal 
disorder; 
(b) by extending effective administration and control of all populated 
areas which involves (i) a large measure of squatter resettlement 
into compact groups, (ii) a strengthening of the local administration, 
(iii) provision of road communication [sic] in isolated populated 
areas, (iv) setting up of police posts in these areas. 
(c) by exploiting these measures with good propaganda, both 
constructive and destructive.61 
  
As a result, during the Malayan Emergency, British forces can be said to 
have "waged war psychologically" instead of just conducting PSYOP in 
support of a strategy lacking an appreciation of the conflict's psychological 
component.   
 While United Kingdom's PSYOP did match the first hypothesis in the 
medium-high range, British actions kept the approaches outlined in this 
hypothesis from being fully implemented during the Malayan Emergency. In the 
first hypothesis where cultural knowledge and rapid reactions to target audience 
                                            
61 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960, 236–237. 
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feedback are required, United Kingdom forces displayed only a moderate level of 
reacting rapidly to insurgent actions. This is because only a small number of staff 
members in the federal Emergency Information Service could actually create 
radio or print products and the fact that this staff did not maintain full operational 
capability on a 24-hour basis. Given these two factors, it is unrealistic to rank 
British forces as having a high frequency of producing rapid reaction products for 
subordinate elements because of their limited periods of full manning.62  
 
                                            
62 Derry, Emergency in Malaya, Chapter 6, 3. The "corner-stone" of voice broadcast product 
production at the federal Emergency Information Service level was a female announcer for Radio 
Malaya named Mrs. Tan who spoke several languages and dialects and did not mind being 
awoken at night to record broadcasts as needed. One can infer from this arrangement that 
requests of this nature were either not frequent or not frequently acted on by federal Emergency 
Information Service staff.   
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III. THE VIETNAM WAR (1950–1975) 
A. AN  OVERVIEW OF THE WAR 
With the signing of the Geneva Accords ending the first Indochina War in 
1954, Vietnam was split at the 17th parallel into what would become the 
communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam, commonly referred to as North 
Vietnam and the democratic Republic of Vietnam, commonly referred to as South 
Vietnam.63 As a result of French military forces also withdrawing from Vietnam at 
this time due to the Geneva Accords, United States President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower began providing South Vietnam economic aid to help develop its 
economy and strengthen its military capabilities.64 When South Vietnam did not 
collapse but instead "was becoming a comparatively peaceful and prosperous 
state" as a result of American economic aid and military advisors, the North 
Vietnamese politburo decided to take action, and in 1954, began actively 
supporting guerrilla forces in South Vietnam that sought reunification under the 
North's leadership.65 Known as the Viet Cong meaning "Vietnamese 
Communists," North Vietnamese sponsored guerrilla forces in South Vietnam 
grew to about 40,000 personnel by 1963 and were backed by an extensive 
network of sympathizers estimated to number over 100,000 personnel in 
strength.66  
Initial attempts to stage an effective COIN campaign against the Viet Cong 
focused on United States efforts to reorganize and equip South Vietnam's Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) along the lines of American conventional 
military forces.67 These actions, based on a strategy of attriting the Viet Cong 
into defeat, failed since North Vietnam's authoritarian regime could lose far more 
                                            
63 Thompson, War in Peace, 188 and 192. 
64 Thompson, War in Peace, 194. 
65 Thompson, War in Peace, 181. 
66 Thompson, War in Peace, 186. 
67 Thompson, War in Peace, 193. 
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manpower than South Vietnam or the United States and still remain in power.68 
By 1968, Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam culminated with the Tet Offensive in 
which the major cities of Saigon, Hue, and 30 provincial capitals were attacked 
by regular and regional Viet Cong forces. Although the Viet Cong took over 
30,000 casualties and were soundly defeated by American and ARVN forces 
militarily, domestically and internationally United States Government credibility 
was destroyed by the North Vietnamese forces' ability to stage such a major 
campaign after years of American COIN efforts in South Vietnam.69  
After being elected in 1968, President Richard M. Nixon refocused United 
States military strategy in South Vietnam on "Vietnamization" in 1969, which put 
ARVN forces at the forefront of COIN efforts and slowly began withdrawing the 
539,000 American troops deployed in Vietnam at the time.70 With American 
forces down to 47,000 troops by 1972, North Vietnam took advantage of the 
situation by invading South Vietnam with its conventionally armed and organized 
North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Despite successfully capturing the provincial 
capital city Quang Tri, within weeks NVA forces were defeated and expelled from 
South Vietnam by ARVN ground forces with support from the United States Air 
Force.71 In January 1973, North Vietnam and the United States agreed to a 
ceasefire in South Vietnam, and from this time on, American military support for 
South Vietnam was limited to the provision of military equipment by the 
embassy's Defense Attaché.72 Two years later in the spring of 1975, NVA forces 
once again invaded South Vietnam but, unlike during the failed Easter Invasion in 
1972, found the ARVN ground forces reduced in strength and supported by only 
the small South Vietnamese Air Force. After unsuccessfully facing the less 
                                            
68 Thompson, War in Peace, 196–197. By the end of America involvement in the Vietnam 
War the North Vietnamese forces (both regular and guerrilla) had lost well over 1 million 
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69 Thompson, War in Peace, 208–209. 
70 Thompson, War in Peace, 195 and 197. 
71 Thompson, War in Peace, 195 and 214–215. 
72 Thompson, War in Peace, 195. 
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advanced but more numerous NVA in high-intensity combat, in April of 1975, 
South Vietnam unconditionally surrendered and Vietnam was unified under the 
North's communist rule.73   
B. AMERICAN PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
General Westmoreland did not concur with the recommendation to 
create a J7 staff section to provide planning and oversight for 
PSYOP, stating “that he was the MACV PSYWAR Officer, and that all 
commanders would assume this same responsibility by increasing 
greatly their efforts in PSYWAR.                                       
-General William C. Westmoreland, 196674 
 
Much like other elements of the United States' intervention in South 
Vietnam, American PSYOP in Vietnam began as small, covert operations that 
gradually grew into overt large scale operations directed by several headquarters 
and supported by the United States Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group 
(POG) and South Vietnamese Ministry of Information. Designed to covertly 
"undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-
psychological warfare," the United States' Saigon Military Mission arrived in 
Saigon, Vietnam on June 1, 1954 and began conducting covert PSYOP in what 
would become North and South Vietnam.75 These PSYOP consisted of rumor and 
leaflet campaigns designed to support efforts at creating anti-communist 
paramilitary forces in North Vietnam while reducing communist influence in South 
Vietnam. Despite successfully sabotaging some fuel facilities in North Vietnam, 
this American mission quickly moved from conducting covert PSYOP to overt 
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 28
activities after communist forces consolidated their control of North Vietnam. As a 
result, the Saigon Military Mission's most lasting accomplishment was quite overt; 
by working with the ARVN, a G-5 Section was created in the Vietnamese general 
staff to direct PSYWAR efforts of the newly formed Vietnamese First Armed 
Propaganda Company.76  
Beginning with the arrival of what would become the 6th Battalion, 4th POG 
to Vietnam in 1965, United States PSYOP broadened in scope and began to focus 
on supporting South Vietnamese governmental efforts to communicate with its 
citizenry down to the hamlet level.77 By December of 1967, the 4th POG was 
formed and consisted of four battalions (one in each of South Vietnam's Corps 
Tactical Zones) with its headquarters in Saigon.78 Each battalion was able to 
deploy multiple three man teams to support units in their assigned Corps Tactical 
Zone consisting of up to 13 command and control teams, 33 audio-visual teams, 
and 32 loudspeaker teams.79 Even though each United States Corps in Vietnam 
uniformly maintained operational control over their assigned PSYOP Battalions,  
the staff section assigned oversight of PSYOP in each corps differed widely 
ranging from a single officer dedicated to managing PSYOP in one corps to the 
entire G5 Plans Section in another.80 
At the operational and strategic levels, United States PSYOP were 
theoretically centrally controlled while in actuality several organizations took part 
in there planning and oversight. As American PSYOP efforts grew in scope and 
became more overt throughout the 1950s and 1960s, three organizations 
oversaw this development: the United States Information Agency's overseas arm 
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the United States Information Service (USIS), the State Department's United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of 
Defense's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).81 When it became 
obvious to officials that effective coordination of American PSYOP was not taking 
place between these agencies, a new organization tasked with overseeing all 
United States PSYOP in Vietnam called the Joint United States Public Affairs 
Office (JUSPAO) was created on July 1, 1965.82 Selected to head the JUSPAO and 
its diverse mix of civilian and military personnel was the former USIS Deputy 
Director for operations in New Delhi, India and then United States Marine Corps 
Reserve Colonel Mr. Barry Zorthian.83 With supervision from the USIS and 
operational direction from the United States Embassy in South Vietnam, Mr. 
Zorthian led the JUSPAO as it attempted to coordinate and integrate PSYOP efforts 
of the USIS, USAID, MACV, and United States Embassy staff from 1965 to 1968.84   
The media available to the JUSPAO and its subordinate elements like the 
4th POG to disseminate messaging comprised a varied collection of capabilities 
that ranged from mundane items like posters to exotic ones like bars of soap. A 
variety of printed materials including posters, leaflets, pamphlets, newspapers, 
and magazines were created by the 4th POG presses and augmented by other 
civilian and governmental printing operations.85 The 4th POG also operated a 
50,000 watt radio station in South Vietnam while the clandestine MACV Studies 
and Observation Group established three black or falsely-attributed radio stations 
to deceive audiences in North Vietnam.86 Through direct coordination with the 
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South Vietnamese Ministry of Information, the JUSPAO helped fund the creation of 
South Vietnamese national radio and television stations that also included the 
distribution of radios and televisions to rural communities throughout the country. 
By 1971, it is estimated that South Vietnamese television reached 80 percent of 
the country's population alone, not including the audiences receiving messaging 
through other media.87 Tactically, military units could be provided with 
customized loudspeaker broadcasts or leaflets within 24 hours and standardized 
products in two hours of being requested from anywhere in South Vietnam.88 
Also, a total of 2,700 former Viet Cong who defected to the South Vietnamese 
cause (known as Hoi Chanh) were formed into 36 cultural-drama teams that 
presented pro-government performances in rural villages.89 This effort not only 
reinforced mass media appeals presented in television and / or radio broadcasts, 
but also complimented films presented by mobile teams under the control of 
JUSPAO elements like the 4th POG.90 Some of the JUSPAO more gimmicky media 
disseminated in Vietnam included bars of soap encouraging Viet Cong to defect, 
and slide projectors displaying messaging on clouds, mountains, large buildings, 
etc.91  
C.  AMERICAN PSYOP EFFORTS 
Psychological warfare and Civic Action are the very essence of the 
counterinsurgency campaign here in Vietnam ... you cannot win this 
war by military means alone. 
-General William C. Westmoreland, 196492 
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Meaning “enticement to return or welcome back” and also well known as 
the “Open Arms” campaign, the Chieu Hoi Program was the largest United 
States PSYOP conducted in South Vietnam.93 Established by South Vietnam's 
President Diem on April 17, 1963, the Chieu Hoi Program sought to accomplish 
two objectives.94 First, it sought to increase the solidarity of South Vietnam's 
citizens in order to strengthen the South Vietnamese government. Second, the 
Chieu Hoi Program sought to influence Viet Cong and NVA elements to defect by 
shifting their support to the South Vietnamese Government.95 These objectives 
were not small tasks when one considers that in 1965 over 300,000 Viet Cong 
political cadre and 230,000 Viet Cong and NVA military members were estimated 
to live and / or operate frequently in South Vietnam.96 In addition to actively 
influencing Viet Cong and NVA members to surrender through messaging and 
military activities, inducements were offered to Hoi Chanh (Viet Cong or NVA 
defectors) that included forgiveness for past crimes, resettlement options, and 
possibly even job training.97 Although the Chieu Hoi Program's success varied 
annually depending upon United States and South Vietnamese government 
emphasis, many years it experienced outstanding success, such as in 1967 
when it influenced over 27,178 Hoi Chanh to reform or "rally" to the South 
Vietnamese government's side.98  
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The Chieu Hoi Program’s Structure and Function
American elements: Vietnamese elements:
MACV: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USIS: United States Information Service
JUSPAO: Joint United States Public Affairs Office
CORDS: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Support office  
POG: Psychological Operations Group
POB: Psychological Operations Battalion
POD: Psychological Operations Detachments
MOI: Ministry of Information and Political Warfare
RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces headquarters
CHD: Chieu Hoi Directorate
GPWD: General Political Warfare Directorate
PWB: Political Warfare Battalions
APT: Armed Propaganda Teams
Chieu Hoi Centers: Defector reception and reeductation centers
Hoi Chanh Centers: Reformed defector retraining and 
reintegration centers.























Figure 1.   The Chieu Hoi Program's Structure and Function. Solid lines 
denote lines of authority or influence while dashed lines show lines of 
coordination. 
Despite the heavy use of PSYOP assets in the Chieu Hoi Program, 
ultimately operations were controlled by civilians in the USAID until 1967 when 
they were placed under the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Support Program staff consisting of both military and civilian leadership.99 
Unfortunately, at various times throughout the Chieu Hoi Program's existence, it 
suffered from a lack of personnel resources and South Vietnamese government 
emphasis.100 These problems were compounded by the fact that many 
conventional United States military forces lacked an appreciation or 
understanding of programs targeting enemy forces on a cognitive level instead of  
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just physically. One American Brigade Commander even bragged that his Chieu 
Hoi Program consisted of two 105mm howitzers, one labeled Chieu and the other 
labeled Hoi.101 
Even though the Chieu Hoi Program was designed and overseen by 
civilians from its inception, as a PSYOP, it relied heavily on the 4th POG and South 
Vietnamese Political Warfare units to function. Some of the media employed to 
present Chieu Hoi messaging were leaflets, handbills, newspapers, radio 
broadcasts, aerial loudspeakers, television broadcasts, movies, and even face-
to-face engagements conducted by Viet Cong or NVA defectors. After being 
formed into numerous armed propaganda teams, these Viet Cong or NVA 
defectors regularly operated throughout South Vietnam.102 Although no metric 
was recorded to capture the Chieu Hoi Program's effect on South Vietnamese 
citizens, careful accounting of Viet Cong and NVA defectors was maintained 
throughout the war. From the Chieu Hoi Program's inception in 1963 through its 
transition to being entirely run by the South Vietnamese Government in 1971, 
more than 194,000 enemy combatants were influenced to defect and become 
Hoi Chanh. Even though the majority of defectors came from the Viet Cong and 
NVA lowest levels, this was not always the case, since even long-serving 
Company Commanders and district or provincial officials also defected from the 
communist cause.103 
Another PSYOP related capability capitalized on by the Chieu Hoi Program 
was Civil Military Operations (CMO). While CMO may not always be thought of as 
part of PSYOP, its use in the Chieu Hoi Program clearly supported messaging 
efforts and provided feedback from civilian target audiences. By reaching out to 
potentially or highly disaffected elements in South Vietnam, Chieu Hoi messaging 
sought to rebuild South Vietnam's civil and military society in a manner that 
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would help the war effort while preparing for the peace afterward.104 An example 
of these efforts was the job training provided to many Hoi Chanh before 
reintegrating into South Vietnamese society. This training served to reinforce 
perceptions of the South Vietnamese government's goodwill towards its citizens 
and prepare them for life in civil society.105 By not only attempting to manage 
civilian perceptions of their government, but also actively bringing errant citizens 
back into the fold of legal South Vietnamese society, the Chieu Hoi Program's 
PSYOP included significant CMO elements. 
In addition to containing elements of CMO, Chieu Hoi Program PSYOP also 
provided valuable intelligence on Viet Cong and NVA forces. This intelligence 
enabled America PSYOP to support elements of MACV counter-intelligence and 
physical attack operations. Hoi Chanh provided by the Chieu Hoi Program 
offered up intelligence not only on Viet Cong or NVA force locations, but also on 
weapon caches and other communist resources in South Vietnam.106 
Additionally, Hoi Chanh served in armed propaganda teams that furthered the 
Chieu Hoi Program, while acting in a similar capacity as the famous Kit Carson 
Scouts who were guides and civilian liaisons for American military units in South 
Vietnam.107 The intelligence and experience these teams brought to American 
forces greatly enhanced the use of physical attacks to destroy communist forces 
in South Vietnam. Although neither the counter-intelligence nor physical attack 
benefits United States forces gained from the Chieu Hoi Program were 
publicized, these contributions allowed American PSYOP to make significant 
contributions to other operations underway in South Vietnam at the time. 
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D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
The Psychological Operations program is the least understood, the 
most difficult to explain, and surely the hardest to measure of any of 
our efforts in Vietnam. 
-General William C. Westmoreland, 1968108 
Out of the three hypotheses presented in this thesis, the United States' 
PSYOP during the Vietnam War followed the conditions-setting pattern described 
by this thesis' second hypothesis more closely than those put forth in the first and 
third hypotheses. In Table 5: Vietnam War Hypothesis Testing Matrix, the relative 
levels of each variable that were found in this case study are shown along with 
how these levels match this study's three hypotheses. 
 
Table 5.   Vietnam War Hypothesis Testing Matrix 
In fact, no hypothesis presented in this paper predicted a high level of increased 
PSYOP effectiveness in this case study. While the largest PSYOP conducted by 
American forces in South Vietnam, the Chieu Hoi Program, did prove to be 
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tactically successful by causing desertions in enemy forces, at the strategic and 
operational levels the United States failed to conduct PSYOP in any meaningful 
way. This stands in sharp contrast to the North Vietnamese forces who, although 
poor at influencing American audiences at the tactical level, conducted a 
"diverse, disguised, and emotionally strident" PSYOP campaign at the operational 
and strategic levels.109  
 For the second hypothesis presented in this study, United States PSYOP 
only matched its predictions to a moderate degree. Although American forces 
used arguably the widest array of media types ever applied to a PSYOP 
campaign, the high level of consistency this variable achieved was moderated by 
the low level of centralized control exhibited by American forces. Despite  the 
centralized model used to plan and conduct PSYOP in Vietnam headed by the 
JUSPAO, "it could be said that in Vietnam, U.S. PSYOP was truly decentralized, 
more often than not going its own way, oblivious to JUSPAO control."110 Adding to 
the decentralization of PSYOP efforts in Vietnam was American forces' habit of 
presenting their South Vietnamese counterparts with plans to execute, which 
they did not help to draft, and sometimes actually found offensive because of the 
terminology used in proposed messaging.111 
 In both the first and third hypotheses, United States PSYOP conducted in 
Vietnam only matched predicted outcomes at the medium to low level. Despite 
the rapid dissemination of customized PSYOP products American forces were 
capable of achieving, quick reaction products were "the exception rather than the 
rule" in Vietnam.112 Instead, standardized leaflets and other products focused on 
strategic messages were frequently used, since it was common for military 
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commanders measure PSYOP effectiveness in terms of products disseminated 
instead of based on actions taken by these products' target audience.113 The 
level of cultural knowledge leveraged in the conduct of American PSYOP was 
even less than their level of reaction to target audience feedback. In addition to 
often excluding South Vietnamese military counterparts in PSYOP planning, most 
Vietnamese involved in this process worked in a subordinate position to 
American planners as mere interpreters, which coupled with their cultural 
inclination not to cause offense, set conditions in which PSYOP products were 
being approved for dissemination by individuals lacking the competence to 
effectively make such decisions.114 This low level of leveraging cultural 
knowledge about the Vietnamese people, coupled with a moderate level of 
reacting to target audience feedback, left this case study matching the first 
hypothesis at only a medium to low level.     
 Just like the first hypothesis' match to this case study, the third hypothesis 
also only matched United States PSYOP in Vietnam at the medium to low level. 
Despite the availability of PSYOP products and personnel available to assist 
commanders at all levels, PSYOP were often given a lower priority to more 
conventional missions, which also made gathering intelligence for PSYOP an 
under-resourced affair throughout the war.115 This left such operations' support 
for other tactical operations being moderate at best. Also, despite the emphasis 
placed on PSYOP by senior American commanders like General William C. 
Westmoreland, the United States failed to plan and implement a strategy to  
conduct PSYOP at the strategic level and to conduct the war itself in a manner 
that took account of the conflict's psychological aspects (both domestically and 
internationally).116   
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IV. THE KENYAN EMERGENCY (1952–1960) 
From evidence coming forward from screening teams and the 
improved intelligence services, it is now clear that Mau Mau is 
wider spread and deeper rooted than was thought possible even six 
months ago.                                       
-General Sir George Erskine, 1953117 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY 
Originally part of the British East African Protectorate formed in 1895, by 
1920 Kenya, with its growing number of Anglo settlers, became one of the United 
Kingdom's Crown Colonies administered by a British governor.118 As a colony, 
Kenya contributed troops to the United Kingdom during World War II, which 
included native Kenyans loosely referred to as the "Forty Group" based on their 
year of enlistment. Although largely unknown outside of Kenya, members of the 
Forty Group experienced treatment as soldiers that exceeded what they were 
accustomed to receiving as agricultural laborers back in Kenya. This difference 
between life in the British Army and as an African Kenyan became even more 
pronounced when the Forty Group, along with every other African Kenyan, 
experienced a 40 percent reduction in their standard of living after World War II, 
while their Anglo countrymen continued to experience growing prosperity.119  
Fostered by these perceptions of inequality and a growth in African 
nationalist sentiment, the Kenyan African Union (KAU) political party was formed 
in 1944 when Kenya's British administration lifted wartime restrictions on political 
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activities.120 By 1950, a dozen members of the KAU drawn from the Kikuyu Tribe, 
which dominated the party, decided that more active measures were needed to 
address economic injustices imposed upon Kenyan Africans by the British 
administration. This resulted in the formation of the Kiambaa Parliament that 
signaled the start of Kikuyu resistance organizations and would come to be 
called the Mau Mau by British authorities.121 Unlike other resistance 
organizations that found unity from and recruited with an ideology like 
Communism, the loosely grouped units forming the "Land Freedom Army" or 
"Freedom Struggle Association," termed Mau Mau by the British, were unified by 
an oath of allegiance.122 By incorporating elements of traditional Kikuyu tribal 
ceremonies and breaking strongly held taboos, these oaths and their 
accompanying ceremonies served to "psychologically mark" oath takers and 
provide the Mau Mau with recruits and resources. An example of the basic "unity 
oath," which brought recruits, willing or not, into the Mau Mau movement is 
shown below.123 
I speak the truth and vow before God 
And before this movement. 
The movement of Unity, 
The Unity which is put to the test 
The Unity that is mocked with the name of "Mau Mau," 
That I shall go forward to fight for the land, 
The lands of Kirinyaga that we cultivated,  
The lands which were taken by the Europeans 
And if I fail to do this 
May this oath giver kill me, 
May this seven kill me, 
May this meat kill me. 
I speak the truth that I shall be working together 
With the forces of the movement of Unity 
And I shall help it with any contribution for which I am asked, 
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I am going to pay sixty-two shilling and fifty cents and a ram for the 
movement 
If I do not have them now I shall pay in the future  
And if I fail to do this 
May this oath kill me, 
May this seven kill me, 
May this meat kill me.124 
In October of 1952, Mau Mau activities designed to increase their 
resources and span of control resulted in the murder of Kikuyu Senior Chief 
Waruhiu, one of the British administration's staunchest allies.125 Chief Waruhiu's 
murder, coupled with increasing lawlessness throughout the colony, caused the 
United Kingdom to officially declare Colonial Kenya as being in a state of 
emergency. Under the leadership of Kenya's British governor, the "weak, sickly, 
and often ... indecisive" Sir Evelyn Baring, additional military units were 
requested and sent to help quell the emergency consisting of regular British 
Army units and colonial African units.126 The first major operation conducted by 
British forces, OPERATION JOCK SCOTT from 20–21 October of 1952, resulted in 
the opening of detention camps and detention of numerous Kikuyu political 
figures to include the controversial Jomo Kenyetta. While Anglo Kenyans felt 
these measures were productive, since politicians like Jomo Kenyetta were 
thought to have instigated the Mau Mau movement, African Kenyans perceived 
these events quite differently.127 As a result, the 12,500 Mau Mau thought to be 
active combatants in 1952 soon grew in number to over 100,000 within roughly 
one year.128  
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Despite the Mau Mau insurgency's growth, British forces (both civil and 
military) in Kenya still lacked a coherent strategy for conducting COIN operations 
against and collecting intelligence on the Mau Mau in early 1953.129 After the 
night of March 26, 1953, it was obvious this situation was intolerable. On that 
night, Mau Mau forces raided the Naivasha Police Station in the Rift Valley where 
they freed over 150 prisoners and captured a large quantity of small arms and 
ammunition (to include machineguns). On that same evening, Mau Mau forces 
attacked the Central Province's village of Lari where 97 African Kenyan civilians 
were killed and 29 wounded.130 As a result of the frustration this caused the 
United Kingdom's government at its highest levels, Prime Minister Sir Winston 
Churchill personally selected and assigned General Sir George Erskine to take 
command of all Kenya's security forces in May 1953.131  
Recognizing that British forces' ability to collect timely and accurate 
information on the Mau Mau was critical to waging a COIN campaign, General 
Erskine expanded the British Intelligence Section's Special Branch, which 
included expanding the military's network of Field Intelligence Officers and 
Assistants throughout Kenya.132 This resulted in an exceptional increase in 
information on the Mau Mau insurgents, since it not only coordinated the efforts 
of intelligence personnel with operational forces, but it also led to the innovative 
formation of pseudo-gangs composed of Mau Mau, who agreed to turn on their 
former comrades. Initially pioneered by a Field Intelligence Officer named Frank 
Kitson, by 1954 pseudo-gangs had infiltrated Kikuyu tribal reservations and were 
preparing to expand operations into Mau Mau held jungle highlands, which they 
did in early 1955.133  
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Also in 1954, General Erskine's assault on the Mau Mau infrastructure 
began in earnest with OPERATION ANVIL in April. Featuring a large cordon and 
police search in Kenya's capital city Nairobi, OPERATION ANVIL eventually moved 
about 30,000 African Kenyans from the city into detention camps.134 After 
OPERATION ANVIL successfully neutralized a great deal of the Mau Mau's support 
infrastructure, further military and police operations kept pressure on the Mau 
Mau, while amnesty programs allowed insurgents to break with the movement by 
surrendering and renouncing their initiation oaths.135 One such effort that relied 
heavily on PSYOP to offer amnesty was the "Green Branch" surrender appeal that 
resulted in over 800 Mau Mau surrenders by January of 1955.136 Culminating 
with the Mau Mau's most notable leader Dedan Kimathi's capture in October 
1956, British COIN operations heavily attrited the Mau Mau and placed them on a 
defensive posture from which their organization would not recover.137 Although 
the United Kingdom's military forces sent to Kenya for the emergency were 
withdrawn in by the end of 1956, the state of emergency remained in effect until 
January 1960 in order to prevent a Mau Mau resurgence by continuing to detain 
thousands of Mau Mau members and their supporters from the Kikuyu tribe.138             
B.  BRITISH PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
Unlike other case studies presented in this paper, the United Kingdom's 
PSYOP organization in Kenya during the emergency was quite decentralized with 
different parts of the colonial government and military employing various PSYOP 
capabilities quite independently to assist in the common struggle against the Mau 
Mau. Printed products were generally produced by the government's printing 
office and distributed to British civil and military agencies for dissemination by the 
government's Department of Information of Kenya. The government also 
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distributed radio sets to rural villages on which government broadcasts could be 
heard and published various periodicals like newspapers that carried anti-Mau 
Mau themes and messages.139 As the conflict progressed, government print and 
broadcast functions were consolidated into the African Information Service 
agency although they still did not control military PSYOP or tactical product 
dissemination.140 British military intelligence officers working with the police 
force's Special Branch ran pseudo-gang operations in which Mau Mau insurgents 
were turned against their former comrades. At first, a British Foreign Intelligence 
Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer in "black face" would accompany these 
teams of former Mau Mau as they collected information about their former 
comrades or other insurgent elements, but after proving effective teams wholly 
composed of reformed Mau Mau were dispatched. Known as Special Force 
Teams, these groups of former insurgents were organized as an independent 
arm of the police force and specialized not only in intelligence collection, but also 
in actively attacking Mau Mau elements during their operations.141 Even though 
military and civil agencies worked closely together in the field during the 
emergency's latter stages, General Erskine never possessed any formal control 
over the colonial government. This stems from the fact that, although he was 
given the power to do so, neither General Erskine nor his successor ever 
enacted martial law during the emergency.142 Ultimately, because of the various 
civil and military agencies contributing to PSYOP in Kenya with their differing 
missions and resources, the United Kingdom's PSYOP during the Kenyan 
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Emergency ended up being a very decentralized combination of activities 
executed at all levels that contributed toward a common goal.  
C.  BRITISH PSYOP EFFORTS 
I will not tolerate breaches of discipline leading to unfair treatment 
of anybody ... But I most strongly disapprove of "beating up" the 
inhabitants of this country just because they are the inhabitants.                                       
-General Sir George Erskine, 1953143 
As discussed previously, British forces in Kenya did not field an 
organization with consolidated control over their PSYOP during the emergency. 
Still, though, the United Kingdom's PSYOP efforts followed three clearly defined 
lines of operation. The first line of operations involved taking actions that sought 
to correct any unfair conditions or treatment contributing to the Mau Mau's 
recruiting and support efforts. This section's opening quote by General Erskine is 
a good example of one way this line of operations was applied. Aside from just 
ordering security forces to quit mistreating African Kenyans, this order was 
reinforced with specific instructions for units to stop offering cash payments or 
other forms of recognition for every African Kenyan killed by security force 
personnel because they were ostensibly a Mau Mau.144 Another example of this 
line of operation is a program known as the Swynnerton Plan. In this plan, 
communally held tribal lands were consolidated and then parceled out 
individually to African Kenyans who remained loyal to the colonial government. 
Even though this plan did not create the African Kenyan conservative middle-
class British officials hoped for, it did provide African Kenyans a chance to gain 
titles establishing legal land tenure. This alone was very significant, since before 
                                            
143 Clayton, Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 38–39. This quote is taken from an open letter 
written by General Erskine to all of the security forces (both military and police) under his 
command regarding their conduct of COIN operations in Kenya. 
144 Clayton, The Killing Fields of Kenya, 39. 
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this plan African Kenyan land ownership had been undermined by generations of 
Anglo Kenyan land appropriation throughout the colony.145 
The second line of operations involved various counter-oathing efforts.146 
Unlike other insurgencies where insurgents were unified by an ideology based on 
political or religious dogma, the Mau Mau movement resorted to oaths combining 
tribal symbolism with the breaking of taboos to gain recruits, sympathizers, and 
even material resources by "psychologically marking the oath taker."147 Thus, it 
was imperative that British forces found some way of countering the Mau Mau's 
oathing in order to truly hobble the flow of people and supplies into their 
movement. With the assistance of various Christian organizations in Kenya, the 
colonial government appointed loyal tribal doctors and medicine men to 
administer an oath breaking any Mau Mau oath's power over the oath taker once 
they had confessed to any Mau Mau activities in which they took part.148 In 
addition to providing British forces another conduit with which to gather 
intelligence, tribal counter-oathing also began a process through which former 
Mau Mau members could freely return to civil society at some point.149   
Finally, the third line of operations involved disseminating printed materials 
such as leaflets, posters, and booklets throughout Kenya and even to a limited 
extent internationally in order to eliminate the Mau Mau's popular support. 
Emphasizing the criminality and / or depravity of the Mau Mau and their oathing 
                                            
145 Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya, 145–146. 
146 Although authors such as William R. Polk in his book Violent Politics (Harper-Collins, 
2007) have referred to this practice as "unoathing," it actually relies upon an oath of loyalty to the 
colonial government that nullifies or breaks the Mau Mau Oath's power. As a result, the term 
"unoathing" is rather misleading while "counter oathing" more accurately describes what was 
taking place. 
147 Polk, Kenya and the Mau Mau, 107–123, 112. 
148 Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya, 74–75 and 87. Among Europeans in Kenya during the 
emergency these tribal counter-oathing officials were humorously known as "Her Majesty's witch 
doctors." 
149 Clayton, The Killing Fields of Kenya, 16–17. Even after being administered a counter-
oath, former Mau Mau members could be held indefinitely at detention camps outside of central 
Kenya depending upon the classification of their Mau Mau involvement as being hard-core or 
black (Z1), intermediate or grey (Y1), or the lowest level of involvement white (Y2).  
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rituals, British PSYOP products not only caused Anglo Kenyans and older African 
Kenyans to view the Mau Mau movement with horror, but also saturated the 
Information Environment with more products than any Mau Mau organization 
could ever come close to producing.150 While leaflets featured messages 
encouraging Mau Mau to surrender, government produced "horror books" 
presented graphic pictures of people killed by Mau Mau violence designed to 
shock viewers and reinforce the credibility of government COIN efforts.151 Besides 
Royal Air Force leaflet drops in support tactical operations, the only other PSYOP 
"product" readily available to tactical level military and police units were the tribal 
leaders taking part in counter-oathing activities. 
D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Out of the three hypotheses presented in this thesis, British PSYOP during 
the Kenyan Emergency most closely followed the conditions-setting pattern 
described by first and third hypotheses and matched the second hypothesis' 
predictions at only a medium to low level. In Table 6: Kenyan Emergency 
Hypothesis Testing Matrix, the relative levels of each variable found in the 
Kenyan Emergency case study are shown along with how these levels match this 
study's three hypotheses. 
 
                                            
150 Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya, 10. 
151 Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya, 108–109. 
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Table 6.   Kenyan Emergency Hypothesis Testing Matrix 
Probably the most interesting aspect of this case study is the role one PSYOP line of 
operations played in producing high levels of the observed variables. Because the 
process of counter-oathing directly enabled the formation of pseudo-gangs, and 
these pseudo-gangs (as well as the counter-oathing) operated at the lowest tactical 
levels, this single line of operations provided effective, decentralized, and highly 
responsive PSYOP support to police and military units in and unprecedented manner 
throughout Kenya.  
In the first hypothesis, high levels of both variables are observed in this case 
study due solely to the counter-oathing operations. For the counter oaths to work, 
much less inspire former Mau Mau to turn on their comrades, a solid understanding 
of Kikuyu tribal culture and grievances was needed. By understanding how issues 
like land ownership motivated African Kenyans of the Kikuyu tribe to join the Mau 
Mau, messages could be produced that would help make taking part in counter-
oathing rituals desirable, especially in periods of increased pressure from British 
security forces. Unlike British PSYOP in other conflicts that relied primarily on mass 
media, the face-to-face communication relied upon to conduct counter-oathing, and 
thus, pseudo gang operations put such measures within easy reach of even the 
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smallest military and police elements both in garrison and field environments. This 
allowed these forces to instantaneously respond to target-audience feedback in real 
time much to the chagrin of embattled Mau Mau groups in the area. 
In the third hypothesis, counter-oathing and the pseudo-gangs such rituals 
produced also resulted in high levels of the variables being observed. Because the 
information gained and disruption caused within Mau Mau organizations as a result 
of this line of operations, these activities gained greater prominence throughout the 
conflict and, towards late 1955, even began to over-shadow more conventional 
military operations in both priority and effectiveness. As a result, it would not be an 
over statement to say that PSYOP in the form of counter-oathing and pseudo-gangs 
supported tactical operations so well, they replaced many more conventional patrols 
and cordons previously conducted by British forces. Viewed within the context of 
General Erskine's strategy, this and other lines of operation such as trying to remedy 
the population's grievances combined to provide an excellent example of "war being 
fought psychologically."  
Unlike the other two hypotheses, though, only medium to low levels of the 
variables discussed in hypothesis two were found in this case study. As discussed 
earlier, PSYOP in the form of counter-oathing and pseudo-gangs were highly 
decentralized in planning and execution. Also, even though British forces used radio 
and print products, compared to the types of media employed in other theatres only 
a moderate number were used in Kenya. Whether this was a function of other 
PSYOP success or trying to minimize monetary expenditures, British forces never 
employed all of the media types they controlled to deal with the Kenyan 
Emergency.152 
                                            
152 Clayton, The Killing Fields of Kenya "Publisher's Note." The British Government spent 
over ₤500 million to quell the Mau Mau during the Kenyan Emergency not including expenditures 
put forth by Kenya's colonial government for the same cause. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a 
function of shaping behavior - of friends, adversaries and, most 
importantly, the people in between.                                      
-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 2007153 
A. REVIEW OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
As alluded to by Secretary Gates' quote above, MISO have a vital role to 
play in securing national interests because of their potential to shape people's 
behavior through the targeted use of information. Whether MISO live up to their 
potential or not, though, is matter of campaign planning. To assist in this process, 
this paper has examined three COIN case studies during a period of peak 
involvement in such conflicts by American and British forces to see how they set 
conditions for conducting effective PSYOP. Although what this study found is 
hardly revolutionary, it is evolutionary in that these findings reinforce 
contemporary calls for a more unified force of personnel conducting inform and 
influence operations within the American military.154 Also, this study's finding 
supports many commentators' calls for the United States to adopt a National 
Information Strategy to guide the conduct of American Information Operations 
and its component parts such as MISO.155 
                                            
153 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Psychological Operations: JP 3-13.2, IV-1. 
154 Huba Wass de Czege, "The Art of 'Campaigning' to Inform and Influence," Small Wars 
Journal (September 5, 2010), 34–37. In this article retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de 
Czege argues for consolidating the Army's current inform and influence career tracks of Public 
Affairs, Information Operations, and PSYOP into the "Public Information" and "Influencing 
Hostiles" (36) career tracks. While his approach to consolidation of these functions has its unique 
points, it is not unique among contemporary critics who argue the Army's approach to inform and 
influence operations should include consolidating their current career fields in some manner.  
155 IO Blog (November 22, 2009). This blog's author, Mr. Joel Harding, is the Director of the 
Information Operations Institute for the Association of Old Crows and mirrors opinions expressed 
in other products from think-tanks such as the Heritage Foundation. Blankley, Tony, Helle C. 
Dale, and Oliver Horn, Reforming U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: 
Heritage Foundation, 2008) http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/bg2211.pdf (accessed 
November 2010).    
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Table 7.   Consolidated Hypothesis Testing Matrix 
In Table 7: Consolidated Hypothesis Testing Matrix, the level of 
congruence between each hypothesis tested and each case study examined is 
shown. At first glance, it is apparent that case studies of British PSYOP contained 
equal or higher levels of the variables being observed than the case study of 
American PSYOP among all variables but one.156 While one can infer this 
relationship has something to do with each conflict's eventual outcome—the 
United Kingdom achieving its goals in both Malaya and Kenya while the United 
States failed to do so in Vietnam—such a leap is outside of this study's scope 
and tenuous at best until more research is done on the topic of MISO relationship 
to strategy as an indication of COIN success. What this does indicate, though, is 
the possibility that certain hypotheses examined have greater influence in 
producing effective PSYOP either individually or in combination. 
Further examination of Table 7: Consolidated Hypothesis Testing Matrix 
focusing on how hypotheses results relate to one another yields an interesting 
observation. The variable levels observed in a case study for the third hypothesis 
were seen in at least one other hypothesis tested in that case study. For 
example, the over-all high level of congruence the Malayan Emergency case 
                                            
156 The only instance where higher levels of an observed variable were found in the Vietnam 
War case study in comparison to the other two case studies is when media variety is compared. 
American forces in Vietnam conducted PSYOP messaging with a wide variety of media types 
while British forces in Kenya relied heavily upon face-to-face communication augmented by 
printed products despite having access to other types of media. 
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study showed for Hypothesis 3 was matched by its high level of congruence for 
Hypothesis 2. The over-all medium to low level of congruence the Vietnam War 
case study showed for Hypothesis 3 was matched by its medium to low level of 
congruence for Hypothesis 1. This trend holds true only for Hypothesis 3 and is 
consistent in all three case studies examined. While this trend is significant, it will 
take further research to validate its existence in case studies covering different 
periods and in PSYOP conducted by different nations (such as Russian or 
Chinese PSYOP case studies).   
What makes Hypothesis 3 so significant that it influences either 
Hypotheses 1 or 2? This question is answered by looking back to character of 
each hypothesis as discussed in Chapter I, Section D: Hypotheses. The 
variables examined in Hypothesis 3 characterize a PSYOP campaign that is well 
nested with other operations at all levels within a conflict. Thus, the essential 
question that Hypothesis 3 asks of a case study is "How did PSYOP relate to other 
operational elements within this COIN conflict?" At the strategic level, if a conflict 
is waged in a manner accounting for the contest's psychological aspects and, at 
the tactical level, if operations are well supported by PSYOP, then a conflict will 
display high levels of congruence with Hypothesis 3. These high levels of 
congruence would indicate that Hypothesis 3's essential question would be 
answered "Closely, with operational connections at all levels."  
The variables examined in Hypothesis 2 characterize a centralized PSYOP 
campaign where planning and execution predominantly occur at the operational 
or strategic level while the variables examined in Hypothesis 1 characterize a 
decentralized PSYOP campaign where planning and execution predominantly 
occur at the tactical level. Thus, the essential question that both Hypotheses 2 
and 1 ask of a case study is "At what level were PSYOP controlled within this COIN 
conflict?" A conflict where PSYOP are centrally controlled and use a wide variety 
of media types to dissemination messaging would display high levels of 
congruence with Hypothesis 2. Similarly, a conflict where PSYOP were not 
centrally controlled and relied upon cultural knowledge to rapidly react to target 
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audiences would display high levels of congruence with Hypothesis 1. Depending 
upon which hypothesis was most congruent, Hypotheses 2 and 1's essential 
question would be answered "At higher / lower levels leading to centralized / 
decentralized operations."  
Consequently, because Hypothesis 3 examines PSYOP relationship to a 
COIN conflict's over-all operations, it stands to reason that it held greater 
influence over PSYOP effectiveness than Hypotheses 2 or 1, which both 
examined internal components of a conflict's PSYOP campaign. Even though the 
scope of this study is too small to definitively determine whether Hypothesis 1's 
decentralized control or Hypothesis 2's centralized control techniques were more 
effective, this study does show PSYOP campaigns functioning in a decentralized 
manner do tend to set conditions that are more conducive to effective PSYOP 
than more centralized campaigns. Based on these findings, further research 
taking a more focused view of the variables this study combined as Hypothesis 3 
is warranted to explore how MISO can be better nested into other operations 
throughout the spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity operations. Also, 
further research involving a greater number of case studies in which factors 
influencing whether centralized or decentralized MISO are more appropriate for a 
certain type of conflict (such as COIN) should be explored.      
B. CONCLUSIONS 
As retired Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson stated in his epilogue to 
Colonel Frank Goldstein's book Psychological Operations Principles and Case 
Studies, "These authors lead us to believe correctly that the PSYOP weapon 
system, if employed properly, must ... be systematically integrated with U.S. 
national security policy and objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict ..."157 
This is not only wise advice for leveraging any element of national power, but, as 
the dominant effect of Hypothesis 3 in this study shows, is likely the most 
important factor in setting conditions for successful MISO. In order to facilitate 
                                            
157 Goldstein, Findley and Air University, Psychological Operations, 358. 
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such integration, it is important that MISO or, more appropriately, inform and 
influence operations are given one proponency within the American Army to 
oversee such efforts. While different American military services handle the 
proponency and manning for their inform and influence professionals differently, 
the United States Army, whose force of such professionals is likely the largest, 
currently dilutes these professionals organizational influence by leaving them 
split into three separate career fields (Public Affairs, Information Operations, and 
MISO). Although the United States Army's organizational design for the inform 
and influence functions was not covered by this study, the conclusions reached 
in this study do directly affect the appropriateness of current Army organizational 
design.    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Based upon this study's findings and current issues being discussed within 
the United States Army's inform and influence career fields (Public Affairs, 
Information Operations, and MISO), the following topics comprise areas where 
further study would help to define and refine the planning and execution of MISO 
and the Information Operations of which they are a component.  
1) How important is the integration of MISO into campaign strategy for achieving 
operational goals / objectives in a COIN conflict? 
2) Just as in this study, do the variables found in Hypothesis 3 (degree to which 
"war is waged psychologically" and MISO support tactical operations) determine 
the level of MISO effectiveness in case studies set in different periods or 
examining different nation's PSYOP efforts (such as Russian or Chinese PSYOP 
case studies)? 
3) Aside from the two variables examined in Hypothesis 3 (degree to which "war 
is waged psychologically" and MISO support tactical operations), what other 
unexamined variables effect how MISO are better nested into other operations 
throughout the spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity operations? 
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4) Under what conditions in a certain type of conflict (such as COIN operations) 
are centralized / decentralized MISO more or less appropriate regarding campaign 
planning and execution? 
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APPENDIX A: POST-WORLD WAR II INSURGENCIES158 
The list below is a comprehensive listing of all insurgencies United States 
or United Kingdom military forces were involved with after World War II. 
Location or Conflict Name: Duration: Combatants: 
Palestine 1945-1948 
Britain versus Jewish 
separatists 
Greek Civil War 1945-1949 
Britain then the U.S. and the 
Government of Greece versus 
the National Liberation Army 
Philippines (Hukbalahap Rebellion) 1946-1954 
U.S. and Philippine Islands 
versus the Hukbalahap 
Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 
Britain versus Malayan 
Communist Party and the 
Malayan Races Liberation 
Army 
Kenya Emergency 1952-1960 Britain versus the Mau Mau 
Cyprus 1954-1959 
Britain versus the Ethniki 
Organosis Kyprios Agoniston 
Oman 1955-1959 
Britain and Jebel Akhdar 
versus Talib 
Aden Emergency 1955-1967 
Britain and Aden versus 
Yemeni insurgents 
                                            
158 Zimmerman, Why Insurgents Fail." Zimmerman compiled the comprehensive list of post-
World War II insurgencies this Anglo-American focused list is taken from with the following 
references: Joes, Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook 
and Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, 8-12.   
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Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia 1958-1975 
U.S. and the Government of 
Vietnam versus the National 
Liberation Front and 
Democratic People's Republic 
of Vietnam 
Dhofar 1962-1976 
Britain and Oman versus the 
Dhofar Liberation Front 
renamed later the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of 
Oman and the Arab Gulf 
Colombia 1964-present 
U.S. and Government of 
Columbia versus the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Columbia and National 
Liberation Army 
United States 1969-1976 
U.S. government versus the 
Weather Underground 
Northern Ireland 1969-present 
Britain versus the Irish 
Republican Army 
United States 1969-present 
U.S. government versus the 
Movimiento Estudiantil 
Chicano de Aztlán 
Philippines 1970-present 
U.S. and the Philippine 
Government versus the Moro 
National Liberation Front / 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
United States 1971-1981 
U.S. Government versus the 
Black Liberation Army 
United States 1971-1975 
U.S. Government versus the 
Symbionese Liberation Army 
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Salvadoran Civil War 1979-1991 
U.S. and the Government of El 
Salvador versus the 
Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front 
Somalia 1992-1994 
U.S. and the United Nations 
versus Somali warlords and 
armed factions 
Afghanistan 2001-present 
U.S., NATO, and the 
Government of Afghanistan 
versus the Taliban 
Iraq 2003-2010 
U.S. led coalition and the 
Government of Iraq versus 
Jihadists and insurgents 
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED MAPS 
The map in Figure 2 shows Colonial Malaya as it appeared during the 
Malayan Emergency. 
 
Figure 2.   Colonial Malaya159 
                                            
159 Friedman, Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960.  
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 Shown in Figure 3 is a map of South Vietnam's military and administrative 
regions circa June 1967. 
 
Figure 3.   South Vietnam circa 1967160 
                                            
160 Wikipedia, "South Vietnam," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2d/Southvietmap.jpg (accessed November 
2010). 
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 The map in Figure 4 shows Kenya much as it looked during its time as a 
colonial possession of the United Kingdom.  
 
Figure 4.   Kenya161 
                                            
161 Wikipedia, "Kenya," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kenya-
relief-map-towns.jpg (accessed November 2010). 
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE PSYOP PRODUCTS 
Although not only printed media was used in the British and American 
PSYOP case studies discussed in this paper, the printed media displayed in this 
appendix were selected because they displayed the most prominent PSYOP 
themes and messages used by COIN forces in each conflict being discussed. 
These samples are not meant to be a comprehensive collection of products 
disseminated in a given conflict, but do give readers a better feel for the types of 
products insurgents were exposed to in the case studies discussed. 
A. SAMPLE U.K. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN MALAYA 
In this section featuring examples of printed PSYOP products used by the 
British in the Malayan Emergency, all graphics, text, and translations were 
obtained from retired Sergeant Major Herbert Friedman's article "Psychological 
Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960" found on the Psywar.org 




Figure 5.   Merdeka Offer 
In Figure 5: Merdeka Offer a two-sided Merdeka amnesty leaflet is shown. 
The code "HPWS" stands for Head, Psychological Warfare Section. On the front, 
it depicts the letter to the insurgents at left signed by the Prime Minister, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, and the English language text along the right side and bottom 
reads: 
 THIS MERDEKA OFFER IS NOW EXTENDED TO THE 
30TH APRIL 1958. 
ATTENTION 
 THE GUARANTEE THAT GOVERNMENT WILL NOT 
PROSECUTE THOSE COMMUNIST HELPERS WHO ASSIST IN 
INDUCING M.C.P PERSONNEL TO ACCEPT THIS OFFER IS 
ALSO EXTENDED UNTIL 30TH APRIL 1958. 
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The back of the leaflet features a safe conduct message in English and the three 
main Malay languages. It is:  
 
SAFE CONDUCT PASS 
TO MCP PERSONNEL 
1. This safe conduct pass will help you come out of the jungle 
safely. 
2. Wave this safe conduct pass when you meet anyone. 
TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
1. The bearer of this SAFE CONDUCT PASS wishes to leave the 
jungle and come out to the authorities. 
2. Please help the bearer to do so - there will be a reward for you. 
Notice that the leaflets no longer use the word 'Surrender,' but instead say 'come 
out.' It was believed that this would make it easier for the Chinese guerrilla to 
defect while saving face. 
 68
 
Figure 6.   Rewards for the Capture of Communist Terrorists 
Another typical leaflet is Figure 6. Rewards for the Capture of Communist 
Terrorists, which can be found in three languages. This leaflet sets out the 
rewards to be paid for anyone giving information that allowed security forces to 
capture or extermination a bandit. The rewards, varying from $30,000 in respect 
to the Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee, to $1,000 dollars in 
respect of ordinary party members, were tabulated on special moisture-resisting 




Figure 7.   Wanted Communist Terrorists 
The leaflet featured in Figure 7: Wanted Communist Terrorists has five 
boxes for the photographs of communist terrorists on the front and five more on 
the back. On the front, the first, second and fourth boxes depict the photographs 
of actual terrorists. The third and fifth boxes have a caricature of a terrorist 
without a face. The British soldier who found the leaflet has written in ink on the 
front: 
If you see any CTs [Communist Terrorists], give them one each. 
All these are big CTs who have been shot. 
Then leaflets are dropped on the jungle. 
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B. SAMPLE U.S. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN VIETNAM 
In this section featuring examples of printed PSYOP products used by 
American forces during the Vietnam War; graphics, text, and translations were 
obtained from Lee Richards' section "U.S. Propaganda Leaflets to North 
Vietnamese, 1961–1975" in the "Aerial Leaflet Propaganda Database" found on 
the Psywar.org website, which was accessed on October 23, 2010 at 











Figure 8.   Remember Your Wife 
In Figure 8: Remember Your Wife, a leaflet encouraging the distant soldier 
to surrender and return to his wife, child, and country is shown. Records indicate 
that 15 million copies of this leaflet were prepared in December 1967 and 
disseminated in five parts of South Vietnam. Translated, this leaflet reads:  
Chieu Hoi. Returnees are completely free to build their new 
lives, and enjoy happiness with their loved ones. Under all 
circumstances, those who voluntarily come back are WARMLY 
RECEIVED under the Chieu Hoi Program. You may use this leaflet 
as a safe conduct pass. Even without a safe conduct pass or 





Figure 9.   Tet Holiday 
The leaflet illustrated in Figure 9 emphasizes the fact that if an insurgent 
takes advantage of the Chieu Hoi Program, he could enjoy the Tet Holiday with 
his family and friends. Translated, this leaflet reads:  
 The Hoi Chanh are enjoying a Tet meal at a Chieu Hoi 
Center. As Tet is coming everybody wants to eat good food, to be 
reunited with the family, friends, and live a happy life in a secure 
are of the GVN. Your family needs you and sincerely hopes that 
you will return to your parents and wife and children. Tet will lack its 
meaning and your family will be sad if you are not at home. The 
Chieu Hoi Program of the Government offers you a way back to the 
Great Nation's Family and to enjoy full citizenship. 
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Figure 10.   OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT  
In Figure 10: OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT a leaflet prepared by the 7th PSYOP 
Battalion for use in OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT is shown depicting a pair of 
searchlights aimed skyward projecting the Chieu Hoi Program's Symbol. 
Translated, this leaflet reads:  
During the cease fire period of Tan Hoi New Year, all United 
States, Vietnam, and other Allied bases will turn on their searchlight 
at night. The searchlight will help you to find freedom. Move toward 
the direction of light, hide your weapon and wait until the daylight to 
rally. When getting close to the Government of Vietnam or Allied 
units, shout aloud “CHIEU HOI.” You will be welcomed and receive 
good treatment. Guide the Government of Vietnam or Allied forces 









Figure 11.   Safe Conduct Pass 
In Figure 11: Safe Conduct Pass, a 1967 version of the standard safe 
conduct pass used in Vietnam is shown. This version includes flags of the 
Philippines and Thailand on one side and a photograph and signature of South 
Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu on the other. This leaflet's message is 
summed up well by the following translation of its first lines: "SAFE-CONDUCT 
PASS. Return and cooperate with the Government of Vietnam…"   
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C. SAMPLE U.K. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN KENYA 
In this section featuring examples of printed PSYOP products used by the 
British in the Kenyan Emergency; graphics, text, and translations were obtained 
from retired Sergeant Major Herbert Friedman's article "PSYOP of the Mau-Mau 
Uprising" found on the Psywar.org website that was accessed on October 24, 
2010 at http://www.psywar.org/maumau.php. The product is a booklet shown in 
Figure 12 that was disseminated internationally on a limited scale by Kenya's 
colonial government in as part of their PSYOP campaign to discredit the Mau Mau 
movement. 
 




Figure 13.   A leaflet showing the famous Mau Mau leader known as "General 
China" being given good medical care after entering government custody. 
Coming from the collection of British PSYWAR specialist Dr. Rod Oakland, 
the leaflet in Figure 13 depicts a wounded General China being bandaged. 
General China (Waruhiu Itote) was the first of the senior Mau Mau guerrilla 
leaders captured by the government. He was the second in command of their 
military wing. His legend says that he had been stationed in India as a member of 
the British Army during World War II and learned how the Haitians had risen in a 
slave insurrection. A second anecdote has him being lectured on African freedom 
while helping to put down a revolt in Uganda. In late 1950, he took the Mau Mau 
oath. He was first assigned 40 men and trained them in the tactics he had 
learned fighting the Japanese in Burma. Later, he led a large guerrilla force of 
about 4,000 soldiers on Mount Kenya. 
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Figure 14.   A Surrender Appeal Leaflet 
 
The leaflet pictured in Figure 14 is all text and signed by General Sir 
George Erskine, Commander-in-Chief, and by Sir Evelyn Baring, Kenya's 
Colonial Governor, on January 18, 1955. This leaflet was printed by the 
government printer in Nairobi for the Department of Information of Kenya. The 
193 x 230mm leaflet promises fair treatment for terrorists who surrender. Some 
of the text in English, Gikuyu, and Swahili translates as follows: 
The Commander in Chief's and Governor's signatures at the 
bottom certifies that anyone who surrenders will not be punished. 
An Oath not to punish whoever surrenders. 
THE BEARER OF THIS PASS WISHES TO SURRENDER. 
He is to be given fair treatment, food, and medical attention if 
needed. He will be detained but he is NOT to be prosecuted for any 
offenses connected with the Emergency which he may have 




There is a long message on leaflet's reverse side (pictured to the right in Figure 
14). A portion of this text translates as follows: 
  
To all the Mau Mau leaders and their followers 
 
NEW DIRECTIVES CONCERNING THOSE WHO INTEND 
TO SURRENDER. This is the time to save your soul! As you know, 
the government has put great effort in the fight against the Mau 
Mau and it will continue to pursue and kill those who refuse to 
surrender.  
THIS IS THE TIME TO SAVE YOUR SOUL. The 
government has continued to issue directives like this to the leaders 
and followers of the Mau Mau. If you surrender today and give up 
all your weapons you will indeed save your soul. 
YOU WILL NOT BE PROSECUTED BECAUSE OF THE 
MISDEEDS OF THE MAU MAU, NOT EVEN ONCE, IF YOU 
AGREE TO HONOR THIS OATH. THIS APPLIES AS OF 18 
JANUARY 1955. THIS IS A PROMISE TO YOU THAT YOU CAN 
NOT BE KILLED OR HANGED DUE TO YOUR PREVIOUS 
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MAU MAU AFTER YOU AGREE TO 
SURRENDER, ON THE CONDITION THAT YOU NOT REJOIN 
THE MAU MAU AFTER 18 JANUARY 1955. 
 
This leaflet may or may not be the leaflet mentioned by Donald Barnett as related 
by Karari Njama in the book Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis 
of Kenya's Peasant Revolt by a Guerrilla leader: 
On 18 January we went to visit Gicuki Wacira who lived on the same slop 
about one mile into the forest fringe. On our way we heard an airplane sky-
shouting [loudspeaker] an appeal for us to surrender. As it passed us following 
the forest border, we saw it dropping thousands of leaflets. I sent one of my 




The Kenya Government has offered all the fighters a chance 
to come out of the forest and return to the normal peaceful life. His 
Excellency the Governor of Kenya Sir Evelyn Baring has given a 
general amnesty up to today, 18 January 1955. Save your life now! 
Surrender with all your fighting weapons and you will not be 
prosecuted. You will be detained and received good medical 
treatment, food, clothing and general care. 
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(Signed by) Sir Evelyn Baring 
His Excellency the Governor of Kenya 
General Sir George Erskine 
Commander-in-Chief, East Africa162 
                                            
162 Don Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis of 
Kenya's Peasant Revolt (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), 430. 
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